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Abstract
In a time when high partisanship in Washington D.C. stymies the flow oflegislative
productivity, I seek to determine the success of President Obama and the Illth

Congress in

addressing "controversial" policy topics. President Obama entered office with a wide range of
goals, and also pledged to implement a "post-partisan" style of politics. Using policy topics from
the Congressional Digest, a publication that has provided nonpartisan policy coverage since
1921, I seek to determine how successful President Obama and the 111th Congress were in
crafting new public laws. In order to measure demand for controversial legislation, the number of
topics covered by the Digest during Obama's first two years in office, plus the number of topics
from the previous four years that had not seen any legislative action, were counted. Statutes at
large was, then, consulted to learn of any new laws passed in the 111th Congress that address
these controversial topics. Using the Congressional Digest agenda to determine legislative
success is distinguished from earlier works that utilize "presidential box scores," which are
criticized for failing to check presidential success on meaningful legislative topics. This research
on legislative gridlock is especially important during a time when many feel the partisan conflict
between the two major parties in Congress has reached a crisis level.

Introduction
Presidents undoubtedly are sworn into office with an ambitious set of public policy
initiatives which they wish to quickly implement. Each modem president since Franklin
Roosevelt has sought to use his honeymoon period, or the "first 100 days", as a means to see his
particular policy goals set into motion, fully understanding that his political capital decreases
each day he is in office. During the annual State of the Union Address, budget message, and

economic report, the president lays out his legislative agenda which he expects Congress to
begin acting upon. After World War II the concept of the legislative president, or the "chief
legislator", became widespread and many different participants (Congress, citizens, the media,
etc) began to expect the president to playa larger role in administrative politics. Matthew
Beckmann illustrates that although the president is often referred to as the "chief legislator",
most "presidents' direct channels for getting proposals onto Congress' agenda are limited, if they
exist at all" (Beckmann 2008). The question thus becomes, how exactly is the president able to
influence the legislative branch to enact his policies? Is the president the sole authority who
seeks to maneuver through Congress his legislative goals? Based in part by America's bicameral
legislature, as well as the framers desire to implement a separation of powers, the president is not
in a position to command his fellow legislators to follow his policy initiatives. It is this fact that
has lead many scholars in the field of presidential-congressional

relations to fmd that one of the

best tools a president has related to working the Congress is his ability to persuade. Andrew
Rudalevige explains that presidents have worked to build up resources that will allow them to
craft policy "on their own" and circumvent Capitol Hill (Rudalevige 2009, 189). Some argue that
it is necessary to understand that "influence" flows both ways in order to have a complete
understanding of executive-legislative

relations (Andres and Griffin 2009, 106-107).

It has been established that in order to achieve legislative success a president must build
winning coalitions through bargaining and compromise; thus a president will often use as many
of his powers to try and influence Congress (implied, constitutional, bureaucratic, personal, etc).
Richard Neustadt first articulated in the 1960s that presidential power is the power to persuade.
Through his persuasive powers it has been argued that the president will be able to build
meaningful relationships and greatly increase the chances that members of Congress will vote in

favor on the policies he feels are important. The president may also employ media relations,
known as "going public", in order to reach out to American citizens and Congress to gather .
popular support for his policies. This technique implies a strong communicative sense that the
public will appreciate, which was a strong tool for Presidents Roosevelt, Reagan, and Obama
during the first year of their presidencies. It has also been argued that a president can increase his
chances oflegislative

success based on his popularity, a tactic which should invite members of

either political party to vote in favor of a popular president. Evidence also suggests the ability of
a president to prioritize his policies plays a large role in his relationship with Congress (Bond
and Fleisher, 1990; Eshbaugh-Soha 2008). A president will need to utilize as many possible
resources as possible when dealing with Congress, especially when party control, and the
president's wiliness to compromise plays such a large role in his ability to claim any legislative
victories (Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007). After determining that an effective way of viewing
presidential power is by looking at how the president influences Congress, I seek to address how
President Obama and the 111 th Congress worked together to enact meaning public policy. First,
however, a brief discussion of a history of presidential-congressional

relations will aid in further

understanding current conditions in Washington.

Literary Review
What exactly has been the nature of presidential-congressional

relations, and how does

that relationship facilitate success? Noted historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. explains such a
relationship as "one of the abiding mysteries of the American system of government"
(Schlesinger 1976, 1). The origin of such a relationship between the chief executive and the
legislative branch necessarily begins with the U.S. Constitution. The framers of the Constitution,

undoubtedly influenced by Whig ideology, believed in a separation of powers. This ideology
lead to the creation of the three branches of government and a bicameral legislature. Such
structures were put into place to ensure a proper balance of intergovernmental relations;
however, the language of the U.S. Constitution does not offer much information relating to the
proper role of the president's interaction with Congress. Aside from the president's power to
issue a veto, the Constitution does not offer much else in the way of presidential powers related
to Congress (such as "from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union"). During the framing of the Constitution there were discussions between the Federalists
and the Anti-Federalists regarding exactly how much power the president should have. Famous
Federalist Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist No. 70 that, "A feeble Executive implies a
feeble execution of the government". The lack of any decisive language within the Constitution
regarding the relationship between the executive and legislative branch was certainly something
the framers took seriously. In Federalist No. 73, Alexander Hamilton commented on the
possibility that ''the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the
same hands". Including the ambiguities found in the Constitution, there are also historical
instances of the ebb and flow of power resting within the executive branch or the legislative
branch.
Henry Campbell Black illustrates that presidents from Washington through Monroe used
the elevated position of the presidency to push their ideas forward, and did not attempt to rely on
Congress to for approval of their initiatives (Black 1919,9). As the executive branch in the early
republic hashed out the ways in which it handed the changing circumstances of America, the
legislative branch was also evolving. Due to an increased workload the House in the early
nineteenth century, the evolution of the standing committee became the focus of handling

legislation. One needs only to look at the amount of public bills enacted in the first Congress in
1789, which was 93.9, to the amount enacted 100 years later in 1889, which was 514.2, to
understand the need for Congress to change the way it did business. Michael Mezey explains that
the idea behind the committee system originated within the post war Jefferson Congress in order
to gain a firmer hand on policy initiatives that they felt were too much in the hands of the
executive branch (Mezey 1989,69). As ideas of executive authority within legislative matters
fluctuated between presidents, Congress understood the need for strong committees to recapture
the idea of legislative authority. A period of congressional preeminence that occurred, according
to Joseph Cooper, from 1869-1921, illustrates the ebb and flow of power between the executive
and legislative branches (Cooper 2009, 362). During the era of congressional preeminence both
houses implemented a more centralized form of government, which sought to regain Congress'
constitutionally proscribed role as handing "All legislative Powers herein granted". Once new
House rules were implemented, such as Reeds Rules, the Speaker had the authority to effectively
end any minority party obstructionism, as well as commanding the flow of floor debates. In the
Senate change took the form of a group of majority partisans who used the "caucus, the newly
created party steering committee, and the party committee on committees to control committee
floor decision making and to reward and punish fellow partisans"( Cooper 2009, 367).

During the early 1940s until the late 1960s an era know as the "Textbook Congress" saw
a distinct change in presidential ascendency. These senior leaders had the effect of ensuring the
bipartisan conservative coalition was able to limit much of the domestic policies during the late
1930s to the mid 1960 (Davidson 2011,66). The idea of Congress dominating the initiating of
legislation during the late nineteenth to mid twentieth century is highlighted by a study that
found Congress, during 1880-1940, initiated twice as much legislation as the president; however,

it should be noted that this study is not concentrated with "topical legislation" , which is the
central standard related to being able to address the relative success of President Obama (Shull,
LeLoup 1999,2). In contrast with the study noted earlier, Rudalevige illustrates that a study done
in 1946 shows that from the years 1933-1940,just

"two of twenty-four major enactments were

formulated mostly by Congress" (Rudalevige 2005, 427). Due to Congress needing to adapt to a
burgeoning America in terms of being a more global power, coupled with advances in
industrialization, technology, and communication, the president began to slowly exert more
influence in policymaking. The phenomenon known as the "institutionalization

of the

presidency", which became widespread after World War II, seeks to explain the growing role the
Chief Executive plays in legislative policy making. Events like the Great Depression, and to a
greater extent World War II, brought about a period of change where the media, the American
people, and the Congress accepted a White House which sought a firmer hand in policy
maneuvers; however, a more influential executive branch did not mean a less active Congress
(Shull, LeLoup 1999, 62). This trend has shown no signs of slowing down as America entered
the 21st century and issues become more globally centered. No longer is the line in which foreign
policy, which was argued the president generally preferred to focus his attention one, and
domestic policy becomes separated. Topics such as the a global economic marketplace, as well
as terrorists who know no borders or definite identity, account for the necessary presidential
involvement in matters of policy making.
What must first be addressed is what factors a president encounters when he is
inaugurated and seeks to make an impact with Congress. Rational thinking leads one to see that
the basic premise for the president is simply to gather the votes necessary to pass his policies;
however, the best way to accomplish this task is far from simple. Anthony King states that, "all

you [the president] really need from Congress is votes, but you need those votes very badly"
(King 1983,247). Andres and Griffin argue that a president's success in Congress is largely
determined by "political conditions faced by the White House and the president's ability to
exploit them" (Andres and Griffin 2009, 107). George Edwards echoes similar sentiments by
stating that "president's must largely play the hands that the public deals them through voting in
presidential and congressional elections and its evaluations of the chief executive's job
performance" (Edwards 2009, 152). It is the duty of the president to attempt to overcome many
of the perceived obstacles in the legislative process and secure the votes necessary to pass his
agenda.

First, there is the structure of the bicameral legislature. Whereas the executive branch is
highly centralized and facilitates decisive action, the decentralized structure of the legislative
branch inhibits swift decision making. The House of Representatives is a majority rule
institution, with individual power more diffused than in the Senate. The Speaker of the House
commands a high position with control of the Rules Committee, who report special rules that
greatly influence the amending process, thus controlling a large portion of the legislative process.
It is important to note the power of the Speaker of the House, as well as the majority leaders, in
being able to alter policy outcomes by formulating the alternative subject to votes. Leaders in
Congress enjoy the unique ability to compose the drafting alternatives for bills, as well as the
power to decide when such bills get onto the congressional legislative calendar. These so-called
"gatekeepers" illustrate the majority party leaders' ability to set the agenda and are also
instrumental in the outcome of bills that the president will ultimately take a position, by either
vetoing or signing the legislation. In the Senate where individual power is more concentrated
within its members, the filibuster serves as its most influential dilatory tactic. Given the fact that

attaining a 60 vote supermajority to end a filibuster is a significant challenge, Senate rules still
permit an additional thirty hours of debate. These tactics that are utilized within the two
chambers can greatly influence the amount of legislation that comes out of Washington.

Second, there is the partisan makeup of Congress. There have been many studies related
to party control in government (Bond and Fleisher 1990) and it has been established that by and
large presidents are more successful in Congress when there is unified versus divided
government (Edwards, Barrett, Peake 1997). It has been established that members of the same
political party share similar ideological policy preferences and those who are of the same party
as the president will often vote on most all of his policy initiatives. The president must interact
with his party leaders and the nature of their interactions should, "entail a blend of bargaining
and coordination", in order that the president cultivates all the tools available to see his chances
of legislative cooperation increase (Beckmann 2008). It is also true however that the goal of
elected officials is reelection, and alignment with the president of certain policies can have
negative reelection results (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989). Presidents having strong unified
government can greatly increase their legislative victories, which was evident during the Lyndon
Johnson administration, as well as the first six years of the George W. Bush administration;
however, unified government is not a necessary component of success. This observation was
made clear with President Clinton's failure to secure health care reform, as well as George W
Bush's failure to reform Social Security. Certain obstacles, such as divided versus united
government, seek to complicate relations between the executive and legislative branches. One
example of an obstacle of presidential-congressional

relations is the differing electoral

constituencies of the president and members of Congress that can obstruct legislative
partnership.

Since the president is elected from a much broader range than are his counterparts in the
Congress, the constituency needs are likely going to be opposite for each body. Despite the
different electoral constituencies, it is often argued that members of Congress will follow a
popular president's legislative agendas or risk political backlash at the next election. A 2000
study however looked at state level approval and found there to be no relation between it and the
legislative behavior of Senators with regard to the president's legislative agenda (Cohen et al.
(2000). Also, since the goal of elected officials is to be reelected, there are instances when voting
against the president can be a strategic vote for one's on reelection chances (Mayhew, 1974;
Fiorina, 1989). Related to their different constituencies, members of Congress and the president
also have different terms of office. Based in part by the president's limited time in office and the
natural decline of any "presidential honeymoon after the election, a president must act quickly to
set their legislative agenda (Thurber 2009, 13). Also, since those in Congress are likely to vote
based on the needs of their constituents, the legislative agenda of the president can often times
come into conflict with the needs of a member of Congress' particular state or region. Another
aspect that influences the chief executive's relationship with Congress, arguably the most
important difference today, is the partisan polarization of the two political parties.

Having precipitated a sharp decline in power over the last 40 years, state-based political
parties have undoubtedly played a major role in the ability for Congress and the president to
work together in recent years. This trend has made it more difficult for a president to turn an
electoral victory into governing support (Thurber 2009, 17). Congressional candidates have for
most of the latter half of the twentieth century run their campaigns with their own financing, and
have also pursued their interests independent of the president. The last several midterm elections,
including the 2006, 2008, and 2010 elections, have seen a dramatic rise in candidates who have

an ideological and partisan loyalty to their particular party. This change resulting in strong party
leadership and polarized political parties makes achieving legislative success for the president all
the more difficult. As a result of this shift to a party-unity era, the legislative branch is more
likely to cast a vote in order to illustrate the highly partisan nature, and to make an electoral
stance, rather than to make any policy compromise (Sinclair 2009). For example, during the
eight years of the Bush presidency, based on votes where the leaders of both parties took a
definitively opposing position, Republicans in the House and Senate voted the party line 89
percent of the time and Democrats in the House and Senate voted straight party 88 percent of the
time (Thurber 2009, 14).

Several different arguments have been offered in regards to the president's ability to win
support in Congress. Moreover, these arguments are a way of trying to make sense of how the
president is able to handle the unique complexities of his job, as well as those of the more than
500 lawmakers he must somehow work with simultaneously. Given that the framework of the
Constitution is limited with regard to authority between the executive and legislative branches, it
has been the case that informal and implied powers are more likely to account for the shared
relationship of power between the two branches. One of the theories that has been offered to help
explain the chief executive's relationship with Congress is his prestige and power to persuade as
a source of his influence. The ability of a president to influence Congress and to able to achieve
his policy initiatives is one way of determining the success of that president. Many scholars have
determined that looking at presidential-congressional

relations is an essential part of determining

a president's legacy, as well as the relative success or failure of a president. One of the most
noted authors on presidential power is Richard Neustadt. Neustadt's

book, Presidential Power,

has become one of the most widely recognized early writings on the modem president. In his

book Neustadt famously states that "Presidential power is the power to persuade" (Neustadt
1960, 11). Since a primary goal of lawmaking is building winning coalitions through bargaining
and compromise, Neustadt felt that the president should use all available tools (constitutional,
bureaucratic, implied, and personal) when attempting to influence Congress.

The president is also able to use his office to reach out to both majority and minority
members and is often able to entice members of Congress to vote on his initiatives by giving
certain favors. Once in office the chief executive is able to use such incentives as federal judicial
positions, government contracts, offering or withholding patronage positions, and campaign
support, amongst other things, to persuade those to follow his legislative programs. If the
president is successful in bargaining with lawmakers, then the president's legislative plans stand
a good change of taking shape so long as they are preferable to the status quo. The ability of a
president to reach out to members of Congress, either personally or by way of his staff, will
determine to a degree the success that president has on achieving his legislative success (Mezey
1989,97). Also, with the unprecedented growth in mass media communications, the president is
now able to voice his legislative initiatives to peoples all across the word instantly. The ability of
the president to "go public" undoubtedly began with President Franklin Roosevelt using the
radio to broadcast his "fireside chats" to explain his New Deal programs, as well as to allay the
public's fears.
Before entering office President Barack Obama championed bipartisanship and once he
was sworn in as president, Obama attempted to keep his promise by meeting GOP lawmakers,
having his staff telephone lawmakers, and also inviting them to the While House for business
and social meeting (Andres and Griffin 2009, 105). Also, it has been argued that presidential
popularity gauged by public opinion polls, accompanied by an accommodated press corps, is

able to increase a president's chances of success in Congress during their first year in office
(Beckmann and Godfrey 2007). There are several scholars (Edwards 1989; Neustadt 1990;
Rivers and Rose 1985) who have found a positive correlation between presidential approval
ratings and presidential success; however, often times the results of such a correlation are mixed
and may only slightly increase a president's power. For example, Neustadt argued that
presidential approval ratings are influential only at the margins and are a "factor that may not
decide the outcome in any given case but can affect the likelihoods in every case" (Neustadt
1990, 78). It is interesting to note the variance between scholars, but it may be true that since
"policy is made at the margins", the degrees of presidential approval ratings are statistically
significant (Rudalevige Pg. 131). Public approval of a president has also been shown to increase
the president's leverage with Congress (Bond, Fleisher, Wood 2003). Shull and LeLoup explain
that "public support for the president is critical, because it may affect legislative success with
Congress" (Shull, LeLoup 1999,69).

It is also true that the tradition of a presidential honeymoon or the "first 100 days",
usually allows for a window of time when the president's political capitol is highest and
successful policy implementation can occur more easily than later in a president's time in office.
The time known as the honeymoon period is often used by presidents to reach across party lines
through direct negotiations, private conversations, social events, etc. Since a president's political
capitol is highest after his inauguration, an ambitious president is likely to achieve early
legislative success; however, due to the cycle of declining influence, it is often unclear whether
time in office should increase or decrease success. Also important is the president's ability to
craft and control his legislative agenda. It is important to understand that timing matters in
regards to presidential success in Congress. It is necessary for president's and their leaders in

Congress to coordinate how best to promote the president's policies, as well as where to
"strategically position the bill" and how to get the crucial votes needed (Beckmann 2008).
Edwards explains that President Johnson actively met with leaders of Congress, called leaders on
the hill, and Johnson's staff "attended strategy session in the leaders' Capitol offices and were
present at the president's weekly meetings" (Edwards 1980, 120). Davidson explains how
President Clinton used several tactics in order to win support for his policy initiatives, including
naming a "lobbying czar" to try and influence crucial lawmakers (Davidson 2011,263).

Another important aspect is the president's ability to set the agenda, or the "definition of
alternatives" (Schattschneider 1960, 66). From the very beginning of Congress presidents have
shaped the legislative agenda, including when the First Congress "turned to the executive branch
for guidance and discovered in Hamilton a personality to whom such leadership was congenial"
(Davidson, Oleszek, Lee 2010, 303). Jimmy Carter, who campaigned as a conservative, Southern
Democrat, attempted to initiative programs to make government more efficient. Carter's attempts
to balance the budget, as well as his modest energy regulations, proved to be out of step with the
agenda of Congress who had "little sympathy" for his agenda (Shull and LeLoup 1999,81).
Agenda control was a landmark aspect of the Reagan presidency. After capturing the White
House and landing a majority in the Senate, Reagan was able to carefully craft his legislative
agenda and was greatly rewarded. By courting legislators Reagan was able to win support for his
fiscal policies which would become one of the hallmarks of his presidency. Fellow conservative
George W. Bush also pursued a "narrowed and focused" legislative agenda and was able to
bargain and engage in active "salesmanship" in order to win passage of his 10-year $1.35 trillion
tax cut (Davidson 2011,257).

Another way in which presidents interact with Congress is by simply acting unilaterally.
While this method may be the most controversial, it is certainly the most effective in the eyes of
the president at getting things done as quickly as possible. The idea of the administrative
president is one in which the president makes use of executive orders and reorganization plans in
order to move his initiatives more quickly through Congress. The idea of unilateral action by
decree of the president is not uncommon and has occurred regularly throughout history.
President Lincoln unilaterally decided to suspend habeas corpus during the Civil War, President
Theodor Roosevelt sent out the Great While Fleet from 1907-1909, and President George W.
Bush utilized several executive orders aimed at keeping Americans safe during the War on
Terrorism. Obama has utilized his presidential authority to issue executive orders when partisan
wrangling would have made it difficult to achieve a quick decision. Several ofObama's
executive orders happened to come within the sphere of foreign relations, and have included
blocking property and certain transactions with Libya, North Korea, Iran, as well as a review of
those detained at Guantanamo Bay prison. Often times partisan wrangling, as well as the
inherently slow pace in which the lawmaking process moves, the president is able to act in a
more unilateral way in order to see progress made.

Americans undoubtedly witnessed a dramatic shift in the unilateral authority of the
president after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. President George W. Bush used his
executive authority to expand the government's ability to conduct surveillance, as well as to
capture and detain those suspected of begin terrorists (Cooper 2009,385). The idea of a president
more interested in foreign policy matters is the subject of the "two-presidencies"

theory first

articulated by political scientist Aaron Wildavsky in the 1960s. The two-presidencies theory
simply states that the United States has two presidents, one who is concerned with domestic

affairs, and the other who is interested in international affairs. The reasoning behind the twopresidencies theory is that presidents are more likely to achieve success in foreign policy matters
due in part to greater constitutional authority in foreign matters, as well as Congresses
traditionally established role as primarily a legislative body. The two-presidencies theory
however does not appropriately measure the degree to which matters are labeled as being either
foreign or domestic. Now that the United States must necessarily see foreign, as well as domestic
issues in a more global perspective, the idea that diplomacy begins and ends at the United States'
boarders is no longer a reality. It is important however to recognize the two-presidencies theory
as an early scholarly work which focused on why presidents may have more authority in certain
spheres of governing than in others.

Research Design
This research design is based on scores gathered from the Congressional Digest
publication. The dependent variable in this research is the relative success of the president in
addressing "controversial legislation" , and the independent variable is the actual scores
president's receive in regards to their ability to tackle the controversial legislation. Most
important to this study is the productivity of the president and Congress in crafting and passing
''topical legislation". What is meant by topical legislation is public policy that is important and
reflects real world concerns that the public feels strongly about and believes the government
should act upon. My research design is not concerned with legislative productivity that addresses
appropriations, amendments, continuing resolutions, innate public policy, senate confirmations,
etc. Since the main goal of this research is determining the overall success of the president, the
scores calculated using the Digest is a central aspect of the research. These policy scores allow

for a consistent measure of success rates beginning with President Coolidge and ending with
President Obama.

The scores calculated using the Digest are distinguished from previous research seeking
to determine success (Lockerbie et al 1998; Bond and Fleisher 1980) for several reasons. First,
presidential support scores, which refer to calculating data using House and Senate roll call
votes, weigh all votes equally. Such scores do not take into account the amount of bargaining and
compromise that occurs to ultimately alter the basic framework of the legislation the president
may have originally wanted. Also, focusing on presidential support scores may include multiple
votes on the same issue, which can ultimately skew a president's "batting average" based also on
how many amendments Congress considers on the floor of either house. Second, seeking to
determine presidential success using support or "box scores", ultimately leads to scores which
reflect instances where the president chooses his legislative battles carefully. For example, when
a recent Congressional Quarterly study determined that in 2009 President Obama had the
highest score ranking of any president in the publication'S history, there is a need to look deeper
1

in order to obtain the facts. The most important aspect of such high scores reflects the idea of
choosing legislative battles carefully.

In 2009 the House of Representatives cast 991 votes. President Obama took a position on
72 votes and won on 68 of them, thus gathering an average House score of 94.4%. Conversely,
the Senate in 2009 cast 397 roll call votes in which Obama took a position on 79 and was
victorious on 78 votes, thus achieving an average Senate score of 98.7%. It is interesting to point
out that 32 ofObama's

Senate victories came from confirmation votes where it would not make

sense for many democratic senators to oppose the president's wishes. Obama's House and Senate
1 http://www

.brookings.eduJ opinions/20 10/0 113_ obama _congress _binder.aspx

scores average out to a congressional average of 96.7%. Based on the previous statements
regarding congressional box scores, it should be apparent that there is a large degree of variance
in determining presidential success. This is not to say that my research method is the best or only
way to determine a level of relative presidential success, it is simply another way of looking at
how one is able to address presidential success within the legislative arena. My research design is
distinguished from using such data and is concerned with obtaining scores which reflect
instances where the president is not in a position to pick which policies he will support and
which he will not take a position.
Being able to determine which issues the president and Congress need to act upon and by
taking away the ability of a president to choose which topics he feels needs to be addressed, my
research design reflects a more balanced look at presidential success scores. All ''topics'' were
chosen in exactly the same way by counting the number of policy topics the Digest published
during a calendar year, plus topics from the previous four years that had not seen any policy
advancement. Topics from the previous four years were included to create the "demand" for
controversial legislation and were also included to give the president a larger pool of important
legislative topics to choose from, as well as to allow the president to capitalize on the failure of
the previous administration to act on such important topics. Each president's score for his first
and second year in office, as well as his first Congress, are listed in Tables 1-3 below.

Results
Each table provides an opportunity to see how well each president was able to address the
"controversial legislation". The analysis in Table 1 illustrates the rate of success presidents
received by their ability to address the topical legislation, provided by the Digest, during their

first year in office. The results illustrate several important points. First, the ability of a president
to enjoy united government ultimately increases their chances at achieving legislative success.
Presidents Johnson, Roosevelt, Clinton, and Obama all enjoyed large Democratic majorities in
both houses of Congress. Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha explains the importance of unified
government by stating that when all other variables are at their means, "a one standard deviation
increase in the minimum percentage of congressional seats held by the president's party
increases the probability of a legislative success for the president by .05 or 5 percent"
(Eshbaugh-Soha 2008). Second, the president was able to utilize the "political time" in
Washington in order to pass his legislative proposals. During President Obama's first year in
office the American economy, as well the global economy was in need of serious attention.
President Obama was able to capitalize on call for governmental action in order to fix the
economy. Presidents Roosevelt and Johnson also used saliency as a means to grow the size of
government and pass their legislative initiatives.

Table 1. Topics addressed and the laws passed during a President's first year in office
President
Johnson
Roosevelt!
Roosevelt2
Clinton 1
Obama
Kennedy
Eisenhower2
Roosevelt3
Carter
Nixon2
Roosevelt-Truman
Coolidge
Truman
Clinton2
w. Bush2
Reagan 1
Reagan2
W. Bushl
Hoover
Nixon 1
Bush

Laws Enacted1st
11
10
5
6
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

Yr.

Total Topics lst Yr.
30

36
28
37
40
34

36
38
40
32
39
32
32
33
34

% Passed 1st Yr.

36.7
27.8
17.9
16.2

15.0
14.7
11.1
10.5
10.0
9.4

7.7
6.3
6.3
6.0

41
42

5.9
5.7
4.9
4.8

27

3.7

30
34

2.9

35

3.3

Eisenhower 1

o

38

0.0

Table 2 presents data that illustrates how well presidents tackled topical legislative during
their second year in office. When looking at the data gathered from Table 2, it is interesting to
note the degrees of variance between presidents. Using legislation is the basis for determining
legislative success; it is interesting to see how several of the successful or "great" presidents
compare to President Obama. For example, President Reagan, who is often held in high regard
for his communication skills and dedication to reduce the size of government, only achieve three
major policy victories during his second year in office. While Reagan was able to achieve some
bipartisan support for his major tax-cut policy, he faced divided government until his last two
years in office, in which Democratic majorities were held in both houses of Congress. Also,
fellow conservative George W. Bush, who enjoyed a Republican majority in the House and large
Republican numbers in the Senate, despite Senator Jeffords switching parties, was only able to
achieve five policy victories. Despite Bush's high approval ratings during the immediate
aftermath of September 11th, 2001, his legislative average is nowhere near that of President
Obama's in 2010. Some ofthe data from Table 2 came as a surprise, most notably President
Richard Nixon's high legislative score during the second year of his first term in office. Nixon
was able to win legislative victories for his more moderate proposals, including the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act of 1970, as well as the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Table 2. Topics addressed and the laws passed during a President's second year in office
President

Laws Enacted 2nd Yr.

Roosevelt 1
Eisenhower2
Nixon 1

11

Obama
Kennedy

7

Johnson

9
8
7
4

Total Topics 2nd Yr.
37

38
34
34
36
22

% Passed 2nd Yr.
29.7
23.6
23.5

20.5
19.4

18.1

Reagan2
Bush
Clinton 1
Roosevelt-Truman
Nixon2
Carter
Truman
Eisenhower 1
Roosevelt2
W. Bushl
Hoover
Roosevelt3
Reagan 1
Coolidge
W.Bush2
Clinton2

7
6
6
6
5
5
5
6
4
5
3
3
3
2
2
1

42
36
37
38
36
37
37
45
34
43
32
38
39
28
37
38

16.6
16.6
16.2
15.7
13.8
13.5
13.5
13.3
11.7
11.6
9.3
7.8
7.6
7.1
5.4
2.6

From the data gathered in Table 3 one can see that Obama did quite well during his first
Congress. Some of the data presented in Table 3 should not as a surprise. For example, during
the first Congress of President Clinton's second term, his legislative "batting average" was a
mere 4.2%. This statistic should not come as a surprise as Clinton faced the Republican takeover
of Congress that resulted in large Republican majorities in both houses, as well as impeachment
proceedings that served to weaken his authority as president. Obama tied with Eisenhower at
17.5% legislation passed and was only outperformed by Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon
Johnson. Both Presidents Roosevelt and Johnson entered office during environments which
facilitated change and expansive government authority. Presidents such as Roosevelt and
Johnson, coincidentally both Democrats, have set the historic standard, in terms of legislation
passed, in regards to being a successful president. Similar to Presidents Roosevelt and Johnson,
Barack Obama came into office during an uncertain time for America, which included a deep
recession and two wars in which to address. Whether American's were facing foreclosure, deep
credit card debt, or loss of a job, Obama and the III

th

Congress acted swiftly to pass sweeping

reforms aimed at jumpstarting the economy. This expanded role of government, which was

responsible for bailing out financial institutions, as well as the automotive industry, was a
necessary step believed by some to be the best option for averting financial disaster.

Table 3. The policy coverage and subsequent laws enacted during a President's first
Congress
Laws Enacted I"
Congress
15

President
Johnson
Rooseveltl
Eisenhower2
Obama
Kennedy
Clinton 1
Roosevelt2
Nixon 1
Nixon2
Roosevelt-Truman
Carter
Reagan2
Truman
Bush
Roosevelt3
W. Bushl
Eisenhower 1
Hoover
Reagan 1
Coolidge
W.Bush2
Clinton2

Total Topics 1st Congress
52

21

73

13

74

13
12
12

70
74

9
9
8
9
9
9
7
7
7
7
6
4

5
4

4
3

74
62
64
68
77

77
83

69
70
76
85
83
59
74
60
71
71

% Passed 1st Congress
28.8
28.7
17.5
17.5
17.1

16.2
14.5
14.0
11.7
11.6
11.6
10.8
10.1
10.0
9.2
8.2
7.2
6.7
6.7

6.6
5.6
4.2

From Table 4 one can see that 7 out of the 13 new topical pieces of legislation passed
during the III

th

Congress were related to the economy, with health care reform not included but

closely tied to the overall vitality of the economy. Another important aspect that accounts for
Obama's relative high level of success is that the partisanship of Washington matters. President
Obama benefited from large Democratic majorities, including the only two Independent
Senators, who stood behind his policy objectives and voted in with the president in nearly every
major legislative circumstance. Obama was able to exploit the partisan nature of Congress and
focus his attention to making sure the all Democrats in Congress were aligned with his policies,

knowing full well that most every Republican in Congress would be against his policy
objectives. Obama also employed several important tactics in order to win support for his
policies. President Obama undeniably used the media as a major outlet for his calls for health
care reform, economic recovery, energy policy, etc. Obama also gave major speeches in 2009
and 2010 regarding his major policy initiatives, including health care and economic recovery.

Table 4. The Topical Legislative Initiatives Addressed by New Law in Obama's I"
Congress

111-3
111-15
111-22
111-24
111-31

111-87

111-147

111-148
111-152
111-203
111-203
111-296
111-321

Topic

Digest Issue

Renewal of State Children's
Health Insurance Program
Government buying up toxic
assets of financial institutions
Changes in the bankruptcy code
to reduce foreclosures
Reform of unfair credit card
practices
Expanding the FDA's ability to
regulate tobacco production and
messaging
AIDS research funding and the
reauthorization of the Ryan
White CARE Act
Spending money on job creation
using the Hiring Incentives
to Restore Employment Act
Reforming the nation's health
care system to expand coverage,
cut costs, and improve quality
Allowing the government to take
over student loans
Limiting executive pay
compensation for companies that
received bailout funds
Creating a new Consumer
Protection Agency
Funding for various child
nutrition initiatives
Allowing homosexuals to serve
openly in the military

Discussed in the October 2007
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the November 2008
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the May 2009 issue
of the Digest
Discussed in the June/July 2009
issue of the Digest

.Conclusion

Discussed in the December 2008
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the December 2006
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the March 2010
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the December 2009
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the November 2009
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the October 2009
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the January 2010
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the December 2010
issue of the Digest
Discussed in the April 2010 issue
of the Digest

In the 2008 presidential election, voters undeniably came out in support of then Illinois
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL). Obama entered the White House riding a wave of popularity after
an easy victory over Senator John McCain (R-AZ). Having grown weary of a previous
Republican administration that appeared to favor endless wars, unprecedented spending, and an
ineptitude that nearly collapsed the global economy, it is no wonder that such support was given
to the democratic candidate Barack Obama. Such distaste for the policies of the Republican Party
was also evident during the 2006 midterm election when the Democrats regained control of
Congress. On the campaign trail Obama spoke of "change" within the context of American body
politic, and addressed the need to impose a "post-partisan" style of governing in Washinton. As
was evidenced in his 2004 Keynote address at the Democratic National Convention, Obama
embraced the idea that "There is not a Black America and a white America and a Latino America
and Asian America. There's the United States of America,,2. This idea of a singular America
further reinforced Obama's belief in an America that could finally embrace "post partisanship"
in Washington; however, the emergence of a president calling for an end to partisan wrangling in
Congress is in it of itself nothing out of the ordinary. The call to end partisan bickering and the
ability to get to work in Washington has enjoyed bipartisan support from presidents in both
political parties. During his inaugural speech in 1989, President George H.W. Bush spoke of the
need for Congress to produce legislation and stated that the American people "ask us to rise
above the merely partisan'", In 1993 President Bill Clinton pledged "an end to the era of
deadlock and drift", and promised that a "new season of American renewal has begun'".

http://www.americanrhetoric.cOInlspeeches/convention2004lbarackobama2004dnc.htm
.yale.eduJ20th _ centurylbush.asp
4http://avalon.law.yale.eduJ20th_century/clintonl.asp

2

3 http://avalon.law

The first Congress of President Barack Obama was certainly a success when compared to
the first Congresses of his fellow presidents. Obama did many things right, including capitalizing
on a sentiment for government intervention in several different areas, building winning coalitions
with his key Congressional leaders and individual members, as well as practicing agenda control
and utilizing the media to explain his various initiatives. Obama also actively exploited his
honeymoon period by acting swiftly to spend his political capital, while enjoying high approval
ratings during his first months in office. What is interesting to note is that all of President
Obama's legislative achievements were won with little to no Republican support. Those on the
political right were united in their cause to see as few legislative achievements as possible,
including those where the president had to compromise on some of the initial components he
wanted. For the Republicans in the 111 til Congress, they took a political strategy of ''winning by
losing". Such "victories" for the Republicans came in the form of the lack of a comprehensive
single payer health care system, an innovative energy policy highlighted by a cap and trade
system, as well as legislation that would allow a path to citizen for children of illegal aliens who
wish to enter college or join the military (DREAM Act). By simply looking at the data presented
in the various tables, one does not get an accurate telling of how well Obama perfected his "postpartisanship" vision of government.

President Obama was simply not able to achieve a breakthrough in the highly partisan
arena of Washington politics. One needs to simply look at the cultural and demographical
makeup of the country to see that certain legislators were simply not going to support many of
Obama's policy initiatives. Since elected officials are in Washington as delegates to vote in favor
of their constituents, it is not hard to see that there was going to be a large segment of the
population against the president's vision for America. It appears to be wishful thinking to believe

that a president is going to get everybody together and in line with his vision, especi~lly if the
president portrays his vision for America as being "right", or "honest", or "what is needed for
America". The problem with achieving post-partisanship is that each Individual has a different
opinion of what being American means. Attempting to take all ideologies, values, and beliefs
about America and bring them together to fit one president's vision for America simply cannot
be achieved. The lesson to be learned regarding Obama's success is that majorities in both
houses of Congress greatly increase a president's chances for legislative success.
Even before Obama was inaugurated as president it was widely known that most if not all
Republicans in Congress were against his legislative agenda. This fact would make
bipartisanship, and perhaps even post-partisanship nearly impossible. Although Obama did
attempt to reach across the aisle early in his presidency, he quickly ran into a fierce wall of
opposition. Being a former Senator and knowing how the legislative process works, Obama
choose to focus his attention on making sure all his Democratic allies in Congress were on board
to support his policies. Having enough votes and knowing which legislatives battles were worth
fighting for, Obama was able to enjoy a relative high level of success in the legislative arena.
While my research does not rank Obama as having over 90% success rate in a given year like the
Congressional Quarterly data illustrates, Obama nonetheless outperformed many of his fellow
presidents when it came to who best tackled "controversial legislation".
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